INTRODUCTION

On Friday, June 6th, the new Carney government tabled Bill C-5, Part II of which consists of the Building Canada Act.^[1] Following an extremely expedited legislative process that was virtually unprecedented, the new law received Royal Assent less than three weeks later, on June 26, 2025.^[2] The new legislation is intended to follow through on a promise to speed up resource development and streamline federal project approvals.^[3] Tabling of the Bill followed the June 2025 First Ministers’ meeting,^[4] where there was discussion of potential major projects such as “highways, railways, ports, airports, oil pipelines, critical minerals, mines, nuclear facilities, and electricity transmission systems.”^[5] The Bill entered today’s broader context of threats to Canada’s economic security and sovereignty due to developments south of the border such as tariffs and expressed imperialist ambitions,^[6] and the associated shockwaves rumbling through global economic and political orders.

Part I of this article sets out the basic structure and approach of the Building Canada Act as it was first tabled, offering initial reflections and commentary. Part II describes some of the more important amendments that were introduced by the House Transportation Committee and adopted at third reading by the House of Commons.^[7] Part III sets out some further commentary on the broader trendlines and implications of the Building Canada Act.

Overall, while there are several concerning features in the proposed law (in addition to, and likely because of, the rushed drafting and parliamentary processes), much will come down to how the Act is implemented. It may be the case that this new law does not change very much in a practical sense. Projects will still be proposed, reviewed, and built in compliance with binding federal regulatory authorizations and associated approval conditions.

However, the Building Canada Act does provide new, broad legislative authority that creates a new legal pathway for at least a small number of projects to proceed more swiftly — and some might say recklessly — than before. Whether such an approach unfolds as ‘move fast and make things’ or ‘move fast and break things’ remains to be seen. Cautionary tales in the Canadian context suggest that rushing and narrowing review processes for major resource and infrastructure projects can lead to backlash (e.g. Idle No More),^[8] cost overruns, lengthy legal battles, and, in worst case scenarios, devastating impacts to human and ecosystem health.

PART I: THE GENERAL PROCESS AND MECHANICS OF THE BUILDING CANADA ACT

Notwithstanding preambular attention to environmental protection and the rights of Indigenous peoples, the proposed legislation is laser focused on “an accelerated process that enhances regulatory certainty and investor confidence.”^[9] The primary way of achieving this is, to adopt the government’s phrasing, shifting the process from “whether” a project should be build to “how”.^[10] The linear structure of the proposed process is relatively simple, premised primarily on providing project proponents with an early green light from the federal government and limiting — although not eliminating — the chance of a late-stage red light (see discussion below regarding s.5(4) and 5(5)).

First, based on five explicit but non-exhaustive factors, a project is identified and included on the Schedule 1 as one of national interest (“project of national interest” or PONI hereafter).^[11] Second, all federal determinations and findings that have to be made with respect to the listed PONI (e.g. the decision to issue a Fisheries Act authorization for impacts to fish habitat) are deemed to have been made in favour of the project being carried out.^[12] Third, the PONI proponent must take all measures necessary to satisfy those same federal authorizations, and potentially affected Indigenous communities must be consulted (the timing and duration of this third step is unclear and will most certainly vary between projects).^[13] Fourth, the Minister must subsequently issue to the PONI proponent an all-authorizations-in-one document that is deemed to be all required authorizations — and deemed to meet the requirements of all the enactments under which those authorizations would normally be sought. This document must include conditions with respect to the applicable federal authorizations.^[14]

The following elaborates on these four steps and then considers the remaining provisions in the Bill related to federal life-cycle regulators, an exceedingly broad executive law making and amending power, and a reporting requirement.

1. IDENTIFYING AND LISTING PROJECTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST (PONIS)

At the heart of the proposed law is the creation of a PONI list. Under s 5(1) the Governor in Council (i.e. federal Cabinet) may, on recommendation from the Minister, add a PONI to Schedule 1, which is essentially the master PONI list.^[15] A PONI’s name and description can be continually amended and, as alluded to above, a PONI can even be deleted from the list right until the moment that it has received its s 7 decision document,^[16] which of course would mean it no longer benefits from the exalted status that listed PONIs receive, including priority treatment within the federal system. Depending on how the government uses (or doesn’t use) this PONI deletion power, the potential of being deleted from the PONI list could constrain proponents from being too cavalier in terms of demanding exemptions from current federal regulatory requirements (e.g. authorizations under the Fisheries Act), as further discussed below.

The basis for identifying PONIs is set out in s 5(6), which includes the following non-exhaustive list of factors that may be considered:

(a) strengthen Canada’s autonomy, resilience and security;

(b) provide economic or other benefits to Canada;

(c) have a high likelihood of successful execution;

(d) advance the interests of Indigenous peoples; and

(e) contribute to clean growth and to meeting Canada’s objectives with respect to climate change.^[17]

Additionally, s 5(7) requires that before recommending a PONI be added to the list, the Minister “must consult with any other federal minister and any provincial or territorial government that the Minister considers appropriate and with Indigenous peoples whose rights recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 may be adversely affected by the carrying out of the project to which the order relates.”^[18]

It is notable that there are no timelines or other prescriptive procedural obligations imposed on the listing process, although the amendments discussed in Part II will bring considerably more transparency to the exercise. This leaves much latitude for government and proponents, and presumably this will vary on a case-by-case basis. One key aspect to watch is the extent to which the present rush to identify and list projects compromises meaningful consultation with Indigenous peoples. Indigenous governments and leaders have already expressed concerns.^[19] How can the Crown fulfill its consultation obligations (let alone obtain consent) with respect to a large-scale nation-building project within the short timelines that seem to be envisioned by government and proponents? The answer is not entirely clear. Perhaps the only way is for the first string of PONIs to only include projects that are already entirely supported by Indigenous peoples who may be adversely affected by the project.

2. DEEMINGS AND APPROVALS

By virtue of a PONI being added to the list, it receives an early green light for any federal regulatory approvals that may be required. Section 6(1) provides that all federal “determinations and findings” that have to be made in order for an authorization to be granted with respect to the listed PONI are deemed to have been made in favour of the project being carried out.^[20] However, that deeming “does not exempt the proponent of a project from the requirement to take all measures that they are required to take…in respect of an authorization.”^[21]

Again, this shifts the process from a “whether” to a “how” by effectively guaranteeing that an authorization will be provided while still requiring that the proponent actually do what is required to obtain that authorization (subject to potential future regulations that may remove such requirements, as further discussed below). For example, a PONI proponent may be assured that they will obtain the necessary Fisheries Act s 35 authorization to cause the harmful alteration, disruption, or destruction of fish habitat (HADD), but they still have to apply for said authorization in accordance with the relevant regulations.^[22]

Before recommending a PONI for listing, the Minister must consult with any other federal minister and any provincial or territorial government that the Minister considers appropriate, and further to the above point, must consult with “with Indigenous peoples whose rights recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 may be adversely affected by the carrying out of the project to which the order relates”.^[23] How meaningful consultation with Indigenous communities can happen at this stage is a mystery given that consultation is very fact and context specific, yet at this early stage many of the facts and details about the project would still be unknown. Again, the only fathomable shortcut is a context where the Indigenous community is prepared to provide full, free, prior, informed, and explicit consent and deem Crown consultation to be fulfilled at this early stage.

3. ALL-IN-ONE AUTHORIZATIONS AND CONDITIONS DOCUMENT

Once all relevant authorizations are sought pursuant to s 6, the Minister is required to provide the PONI proponent with a document that is “deemed to be each authorization that is specified in the document in respect of the project.”^[24] This all-authorizations-in-one document can only be issued after three conditions are met: proponent has taken all measures in respect of each otherwise applicable federal authorization; the Minister has consulted on approval conditions with the minister responsible for each of the federal authorizations; and Indigenous peoples have been consulted regarding potential adverse effects.^[25] The document must also set out conditions that apply with respect to each federal authorization.^[26] Those conditions are linked to their respective specific federal authorization to ensure sound jurisdictional and constitutional footing.^[27] Conditions and authorizations can be amended, provided the minister fulfills any further consultation requirements.^[28] Schedule 2 of the proposed Act sets out the relevant federal statutes and regulations pursuant to which authorizations may be required, such as the Fisheries Act, the Canadian Navigable Waters Act,^[29] and the Species at Risk Act.^[30]

While this new process would be moving very quickly up to the point of adding a PONI to Schedule 1, it would then presumably slow down as it will unavoidably take time for the proponent to gather information, make submissions for regulatory approvals, and work with regulators throughout these specific federal regulatory processes. Such a slowing down at this multi-faceted stage would, however, be tempered by the creation of a new “Major Projects Office” (MPO), which will serve as a single point of contact.^[31]Through this approach, the Minister ultimately issues a single all-in-one document rather than multiple ministers issuing individual regulatory decisions.

To be clear, there is no harm, and indeed some utility, in consolidating the necessary authorizations and permits in one place. But the Building Canada Act goes further: subsection 7(3) “deems” that the master authorization meets the requirements of all the enactments that would govern relevant authorizations in the normal course.^[32] The use of the term “deem” is critical here. As explained by the federal Department of Justice, “deeming” is used to create a legal fiction.^[33] To understand why such a fiction is problematic, it is useful to recall that modern environmental laws are both outward and inward facing: they constrain individuals and corporations but those constraints are rarely absolute — they’re an opening bid. At that point, recognizing governments’ prior poor track record of taking environmental concerns into account in decision making, environmental laws seek to constrain the executive branch too.

For example, if a PONI is going to impact fish habitat, then section 34.1 of Fisheries Act would normally require DFO to consider several factors, including the potential for cumulative effects, before issuing an authorization.^[34] If a PONI triggers the Impact Assessment Act, the Agency and the Minister are normally bound by section 6 to apply the precautionary principle and adhere to the principle of scientific integrity.^[35] These constraints are guideposts: they do not dictate a particular outcome but help to guide decision-making — to varying degrees — towards sustainable development.^[36]

Subsection 7(3) essentially amputates this part of the federal environmental regime for PONIs. It creates the ‘legal fiction’ that the designated Minister has complied with all these guideposts — even if they do not.^[37] Further, because it is a legal fiction explicitly created by statute, the Canadian judiciary’s supervisory role also appears to have been circumscribed or even negated — a role that has proven critical in securing at least some semblance of implementation of Canada’s environmental laws. It remains to be tested in court, but a section 7 authorization may be effectively immune from legal challenges except those that have a constitutional dimension, such as a failure of the federal Crown to fulfill its consultation and accommodation duties with respect to potentially adversely affected Indigenous peoples.^[38]

4. RELATION TO OTHER FEDERAL REVIEW PROCESSES

Sections 9–18 of the Bill set out how the proposed PONI regime would interface with other existing federal regulators that engage in project review processes.^[39] This is because some PONIs may fall under the authority of these other regulators, including the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland offshore regulatory boards, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and the Canada Energy Regulator. The basic approach under the Bill is to require the Minister designated under the Building Canada Act to consult with those regulators prior to issuing a section 7 document, to consult with them again prior to amending any conditions in a section 7 document, and in all cases to only issue a section 7 document for such projects if certain conditions are met (these vary from regulator to regulator but generally include human safety and regard for relevant international obligations).^[40] Beyond that, the PONI regime leaves undisturbed the processes administered by these federal bodies, with the overriding difference being that all determinations and findings are all deemed to favour project approval.

The Bill also recognizes that some (perhaps most) PONIs may also be designated projects under the federal Impact Assessment Act (“IAA”). The IAA process would still apply, but with one significant modification — elimination of the 180-day planning phase.^[41] For those with an interest in robust public participation and belief in the logic of the planning phase providing the time and space to build relationships and social license, this is a significant step backward. The government could temper this regression by targeting PONIs that are already well advanced, including significant past engagement and involvement with members of the public and Indigenous communities.

Finally, it is implicit based on the text of the Bill that processes established under modern treaties and self-government agreements do not change. For example, a project that triggers application of the Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic Assessment Act, the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act, or the Nunavut Planning and Project Assessment Act would still have to be assessed under those statutes.^[42] However, it is possible that the location of a PONI is within the geographical area covered by those statutes and associated modern treaties. In such a case, the Building Canada Act could still apply as a way for the federal government to centralize and expedite the federal authorizations aspect of the project (e.g. a Fisheries Act authorization). One such example would be the Grays Bay port and road.^[43] To be clear, however, the Building Canada Act would not — and constitutionally could not — oust the applicable northern assessment regime. Rather, one way to conceptualize the proposed new landscape is that the northern assessment regimes that are rooted in constitutionally protected modern treaties actually oust much of the approached envisioned in the Building Canada Act.

5. HENRY VIII CLAUSES

As initially drafted and tabled, sections 21, 22 and 23 gave Cabinet unrestricted authority to make regulations not merely to flesh out the provisions of the Act, as is the normal course, but to modify and even exempt the application of any law in the federal statute book (this power was somewhat tempered by the amendments discussed in Part II, below).^[44]

Such executive law-making powers are referred to as Henry VIII clauses, as Olszynski and Bankes explained when Premier Danielle Smith initially sought such powers for herself under Alberta’s sovereignty legislation: “A Henry VIII clause is a provision in a statute that delegates to a subordinate body the authority not simply to pass regulations or the like under the statute, but to amend the statute itself.”^[45] As was the case there, Bill C-5 initially contained an extraordinarily broad version of a Henry VIII clause insofar as it authorized regulations to modify and even exempt the application of the federal statutes listed in Schedule 2, which schedule already includes many of Canada’s most important environmental laws but can also be further amended, without limitation, pursuant to section 21.

This would be a staggering power — even by today’s standards. Comparing the Henry VIII clauses in all such recent legislation — Alberta’s Bill 1 (Alberta Sovereignty within a United Canada Act), British Columbia’s Bill 7 (Economic Stabilization Act) and Bill 15 (Infrastructure Projects Act), and Ontario’s own Bill 5 (Special Economic Zones Act), the initial Building Canada Act was only matched by Premier Ford’s legislation for its breadth.^[46] As further discussed in Part II, it has been tempered by including a list of laws that Cabinet may not amend or exempt by regulation.

6. SUNSET AND REPORTING

Pursuant to section 5(2), the PONIS regime expires 5 years after the coming into force of the legislation.^[47] Within that time, section 24 requires the designated Minister to complete “a review of the provisions and operation of this Act…and of the efficacy of the federal regulatory system in relation to projects that are in the national interest,” and to present it to Parliament.^[48] This is a laudable requirement — the whole debate about the merits of impact assessment is currently transpiring in what might be described as a ‘fact-free zone’ — but this provision would benefit from greater specificity — and indeed has (as discussed in Part II, below).

PART II: AMENDMENTS ADOPTED AT THIRD READING

Using similar structure and headings as above in Part I, this part briefly describes and discuses some of the more important amendments to the Building Canada Act adopted at third reading.^[49] Overall, the thrust of the amendments is to increase transparency and accountability requirements and mechanisms that will allow for at least some public scrutiny and oversight by courts and civil society.

1. IDENTIFYING AND LISTING PROJECTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST (PONIS)

Added with the amendments that were integrated at third reading was section 4.1(1), which authorizes Cabinet to define the “national interest” for the purposes of PONI listing, including setting out specific criteria that must be met. If Cabinet does not exercise this authority within 15 days of the coming in force of the Act, the Minister must table a report explaining the reasons for the delay and the expected timeline for defining “national interest.”^[50]

Section 5 was also amended to require a detailed — not short — description of the PONI, while a new subsection 5(1.1) requires 30 days notice in the Canada Gazette and the written consent of the province or territory in which the PONI will be carried out if it also falls within areas of exclusive provincial or territorial jurisdiction (bearing in mind that the Constitution Act, 1867 generally grants exclusive authority to make laws in relation to matters falling within sections 91 or 92, not exclusive authority over projects per se). It was conspicuous, during the hasty legislative process, that amendments included attention to explicit consent of provinces and territories but not Indigenous peoples.

Several amendments will also result in the creation of a public registry^[51] that is accessible to the public through the internet and will contain:

(a) a detailed description of the project and the reasons why it is in the national interest;

(b) the extent to which the project is expected to meet the outcomes set out in paragraphs 5(6)(a) to (d);

(c) detailed cost estimates that do not include private sector commercially sensitive financial information; and

(d) the estimated timelines for completion of the project.

This registry will be especially important for PONIs that do not trigger an impact assessment under the IAA (for which a public registry already exists),^[52] although the requirements in 5.1(2) (b)–(d) also differ from what is explicitly required in the IAA registry.

It should also be noted that the requirement to substantiate why a project is in the national interest (section 5.1 (a)) currently excludes the “clean growth and climate change” criterion (section 5(6)(e)). It is reasonable to expect that this glaring omission will be rectified in the near future or that the current government will treat all criteria equally under s. 5.1(a).

2. ALL-IN-ONE AUTHORIZATIONS AND CONDITIONS DOCUMENT

Prior to issuing a PONI’s master authorization, the Minister will now have to undertake a national security review with a view towards foreign investment in particular.^[53] (s 7(b.1)). This part has also been amended to more explicitly dictate the matter in which the Minister consults with affected Indigenous peoples.^[54]

Perhaps the most important amendment to this part of the Building Canada Act regime is a new s. 8.1., which will require the Minister to publish a document that essentially explains the difference, in terms of substance (i.e., conditions) and process, between the “normal regulatory process” to which a PONI would have been subject to in the absence of the Building Canada Act, and the conditions and processes that it has been subjected to.^[55] This Minister must, before the s.7 authorization is issued, make public the information set out in 8.1(1),^[56] and the Minister is also is required under 8.1(4) to table a report that contains those informational requirements.

Combined with the section 7(3) deeming provisions, the Act effective transfers accountability for PONI conditions from the judicial branch, which until now has exercised its supervisory authority to ensure some semblance of implementation of Canada’s environmental laws, to Parliament. That said, the potential for democratic accountability has always played an important role in Canada’s environmental law regimes, which are still largely procedural in nature.^[57]

3. HENRY VIII CLAUSES

The amendments modestly constrained the Act’s exceedingly broad Henry VIII powers in that seventeen (17) statutes have been explicitly exempted from being able to be listed to Schedule 2, including the Access to Information Act, the Conflicts of Interest Act, the Criminal Code, the Official Languages Act, and the Indian Act, to name but a few (see s 21(2)).

Surprisingly, the project-specific assessment regimes established under modern treaties are not included in this list of laws. Presumably this omission is due to a recognition that, as noted above, these regimes are constitutionally rooted by virtual of the constitutionally protect modern treaty provisions that underpin them. As such, it would be fair to say that as a constitutional matter the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act, the Yukon Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment Act, and the Nunavut Planning and Project Assessment Act cannot be added to Schedule 2.^[58]

4. SUNSET AND REPORTING

Finally, the amendments enhanced the Act’s reporting requirements. The Minister has an obligation to ensure an independent review of the status of each PONI is conducted annually, and to table a report of that review within 15 days on which the House is sitting once the review is completed, which review also has to be made publicly available (s 23.1).

The Parliamentary Review Committee that is part of the federal Emergencies Act^[59] regime has now also been given a role in review, reporting every 6 months (180 days) on Cabinet’s and the Minister’s exercise of their powers and performance of their duties and functions under the Act (amended s 24). The Parliamentary Review Committee will also play a role in the 5 year review of the Act, which review is to be based on the “common good of Canada”: “assured in part by the pursuit of the objectives set out in section 4 relating to shared jurisdiction, public safety, national and international security, the quality of the environment, public health, transparency, public participation and the protection of the rights of Indigenous peoples and linguistic communities.”^[60]

It should also be noted that there is a series of amendments to prevent Cabinet or the Minister from exercising their various powers while Parliament is prorogued or dissolved (see e.g., amended sections 5(2), 21(3), 22(2) and 23(2)).

PART III: COMMENTARY

Impact assessment is the logical starting point for bringing into focus the changes brought in through Bill C-5. As described in Oldman, impact assessment is “a planning tool that is…an integral component of sound decision-making.”^[61] The basic idea of environmental assessment is that “certain proposed activities should be scrutinized in advance from the perspective of their possible environmental consequences.”^[62] Colloquially, this is often called a “look before you leap” approach.^[63]

The new regime under the Building Canada Act is not impact assessment. Far from it. The new expedited approach turns the system on its head for PONIs. Depending on the specific project, this could be fairly characterized as a ‘leap before you look’ approach. Instead of a precautionary, comprehensive assessment process for careful, informed, and calculated decision-making about major projects, the new process sets a fast-track for an initial affirmative decision that is not necessarily underpinned by robust informational basis, along with a cluster of siloed and expedited regulatory decisions, all done without sufficient statutory space to see the big picture. The only cross-issue and cross-department integration that seems to be achieved under the new process is bundling all the specific regulatory authorizations into the final all-in-one authorizations and conditions document. Minimal substantive coherence or collaboration between federal departments is required en route to that final point (though perhaps the new MPO will be striving to facilitate such). As such, on one hand it is important to simply recognize that C-5 is not at all about impact assessment, even though impact assessment is a useful benchmark. The Building Canada Act is about what it says it is about: an accelerated process aiming to provide project proponents and investors with early and ongoing certainty that a project will receive federal approval.

But the key question to ask is: at what cost? Obviously, it is too early to tell. Trade-offs and downsides will hinge entirely on what projects are added to the list initially and into the future. In a smooth case scenario, a PONI would be listed in a context where there has already been meaningful public and Indigenous engagement, there is consent from potentially affected Indigenous communities (and perhaps ownership), the project triggers the IAA such that there will still be a federal impact assessment within prescribed timelines, and any applicable provincial or territorial assessment processes proceeds in parallel and fills in any gaps. With some hesitation and many blind spots, we acknowledge that the enormous offshore wind project touted by Nova Scotia Premier Tim Houston may be in this range.^[64]

There ought to be concern, however, because it is rare for so many stars to align when it comes to infrastructure and resource extraction projects of this magnitude. A more difficult (and foreseeable) scenario would be one where a PONI is not a designated project under the IAA, there are very few opportunities for meaningful public engagement, Crown consultation efforts are approached with a narrow interpretation of Indigenous rights and interests, federal departments work in isolated lanes, and applicable provincial assessments are expedited or superficial. The fact that the Building Canada Act creates legislative space for such a scenario could lead to major legal problems (e.g. legal challenges brought by affected rights-holders), not to mention poor outcomes if a project actually proceeds. One need only look at projects like Northern Gateway, Site C, Muskrat Falls and Energy East for cautionary tales.^[65]

CONCLUSION

It is certainly precarious times for Canada. On that, most would agree. And many would probably also agree that present conditions are right for concerted major infrastructure building across the country. The question is not so much whether to embark on this path, but how. Given the features and concerns outlined above, it is not clear that this effort aimed at shifting from ‘whether’ to ‘how’ is actually the ‘how’ that should be pursued. Time will tell if the Building Canada Act leads to moving fast and making things or just moving fast and breaking things. The stakes could hardly be higher. 

• * David V. Wright, Associate Professor, University of Calgary Faculty of Law; Research Fellow, Calgary School of Public Policy.

  Martin Z. Olszynski, Associate Professor, Chair in Energy, Resources and Sustainability, University of Calgary Faculty of Law.

  ¹ Bill C-5, An Act to enact the Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canada Act and the Building Canada Act, 1^st Sess, 45^th Parl, 2025 (first reading June 6, 2025) [Bill C-5, Building Canada Act].

• ² Bill C-5, An Act to enact the Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canada Act and the Building Canada Act, 1^st Sess, 45^th Parl, 2025 (assented to June 26, 2025).

• ³ Mark Ramzy, “Mark Carney’s promise to ‘build, baby, build’ has some Canadians fearing the worst”, The Toronto Star (24 May 2025), online: <thestar.com> [perma.cc/HUE7-EA9A ]. See also see also the recent Speech from the Throne: Canada, Privy Council, Speech from the Throne, 1^st Sess, 45^th Parl (May 27, 2025) online: <canada.ca/en/privy-council> [perma.cc/JB69-W8T3].

• ⁴ Prime Minister of Canada, Statement, “First Ministers’ statement on building a strong Canadian economy and advancing major projects” (2 June 2025), online: <pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements> [perma.cc/G7Y4-9CF2].

• ⁵ Canada, Intergovernmental Affairs, One Canadian Economy: An Act to enact the Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canada Act and the Building Canada Act, (Ottawa: Intergovernmental Affairs, 6 June 2025), online: <canada.ca/en/intergovernmental-affairs> [perma.cc/3QHD-D8FY].

• ⁶ Allan Smith & Peter Nicholas, “Trump’s quest to conquer Canada is confusing everyone”, NBC News (14 March 2025), online: <nbcnews.com> [perma.cc/YY3L-Q4HS].

• ⁷ Canada, House of Commons, Bill C-5, An Act to enact the Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canada Act and the Building Canada Act, Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, 1^st Sess, 45^th Parl, 2025 (Chair: Peter Schiefke), online: <ourcommons.ca> [perma.cc/TS5N-2RH7]. The Senate ultimately chose not to propose any amendments of its own, but it should be noted that the House rose before the Senate was even able to debate potential amendments, meaning that the Senate was not in a position to propose and push for amendments without requiring the House to reconvene.

• ⁸ Laura Beaulne-Stuebing, “How Idle No More transformed Canada”, CBC Radio (26 November 2022), online: <cbc.ca/radio> [perma.cc/8M2F-87MC].

• ⁹ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 s 4.

• ¹⁰ Rachel Aiello, “Carney gov’t tables bill to reduce interprovincial trade barriers, build national projects”, CTV News (6 June 2025), online: <ctvnews.ca> [perma.cc/4LNQ-35YD].

• ¹¹ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 schedule 1 & s 5(5).

• ¹² Ibid s 6(1); see e.g., Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c F-14.

• ¹³ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 s 6(2), 7(2)(c).

• ¹⁴ Ibid s 7(1).

• ¹⁵ Ibid schedule 1, s 5(1).

• ¹⁶ Ibid s 5(3), s 7, ss 5(4)–(5).

• ¹⁷ Ibid s 5(6).

• ¹⁸ Ibid s 7(2)(c).

• ¹⁹ Emily Haws & Laura Stone, “AFN calls emergency meeting to discuss Bill C-5” The Globe and Mail (June 6, 2025), online: <theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/CZ3F-HQ7B]. See also Mark Blackburn, “9 First Nations challenge federal and provincial project laws in court” APTN News, online: <aptnnews.ca/national-news/9-first-nations-challenge-federal-and-provincial-project-laws-in-court>.

• ²⁰ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 s 6(1).

• ²¹ Ibid s 6(2).

• ²² Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c F-14 s 35 [Fisheries Act]. See also, Authorizations Concerning Fish and Fish Habitat Protection Regulations, SOR/2019-286 s 2.

• ²³ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note [1] s 5(7).

• ²⁴ Ibid s 7(1).

• ²⁵ Ibid s 7(2).

• ²⁶ Ibid s 7(5).

• ²⁷ Ibid ss 7(5)–(6).

• ²⁸ Ibid ss 8(1)–(3).

• ²⁹ Canadian Navigable Waters Act, RSC 1985 c N-22.

• ³⁰ Species at Risk Act, SC 2002 c 29.

• ³¹ Supra note 5; Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 s 20.

• ³² Ibid s 7(3).

• ³³ Canada, Department of Justice, Legistics, (2024) online:<justice.gc.ca> [perma.cc/9DBR-TYVY].

• ³⁴ Fisheries Act, supra note 21 s 34.1.

• ³⁵ Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019 c 28; Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 s 6.

• ³⁶ A. Dan Tarlock, “Is There a There There in Environmental Law?” (2004) 19 J Land Use & Envtl L 213.

• ³⁷ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 s 7(3).

• ³⁸ Of course, such challenges have been fairly common in the past two decades, including with respect to the Northern Gateway pipeline project, the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion project, and both the Site C and Muskrat Falls hydro-electric projects, to name just a few.

• ³⁹ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 s 9–18.

• ⁴⁰ Ibid s 7.

• ⁴¹ Ibid s 19; Supra note [30] ss 9–17, 18(3)–(6).

• ⁴² See e.g., Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic Assessment Act SC 2003, c 7; Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act SC 1998, c 25 and Nunavut Planning and Project Assessment Act SC 2013, c 14, s 2.

• ⁴³ See David Thurton, “Here’s a look at some major projects Canada’s leaders hope to fast-track”, CBC News (June 4, 2025), online: <cbc.ca/major-projects-carney-fast-track> [perma.cc/ARE9-D8HB].

• ⁴⁴ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 s 21–23.

• ⁴⁵ Martin Olszynski and Nigel Bankes, “Running Afoul the Separation, Division, and Delegation of Powers: The Alberta Sovereignty Within a United Canada Act” (6 December 2022), online (blog): ABLawg <ablawg.ca> [perma.cc/4H4C-FZBJ]; Nigel Bankes and Martin Olszynski, “The Amendments to Bill 1” (12 December 2022), online (blog): ABLawg <ablawg.ca/amendments-to-bill-1>[perma.cc/5P8G-BE4H].

• ⁴⁶ Bill 1, Alberta Sovereignty Within a United Canada Act, 4^th Sess, 30^th Leg, Alberta, 2022 (assented to December 15, 2022); Bill 7, Economic Stabilization (Tariff Response) Act, 1^st Sess, 43^rd Parl, British Columbia, 2025 (first reading May 7, 2025); Bill 15, Infrastructure Projects Act, 1st Sess, 43rd Parl, British Columbia 2025 (third reading May 28, 2025) and Bill 5, Special Economic Zones Act, 1^st Sess, 44^th Parl, Ontario (assented to June 5, 2025).

• ⁴⁷ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 s 5(2).

• ⁴⁸ Ibid s 24.

• ⁴⁹ The amendments flow from the amendments produced by the review and report of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities (TRAN) (see Canada, House of Commons, “Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities” (last visited 10 August 2025), online: <ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/TRAN?parl=45&session=1>, supra note 7.

• ⁵⁰ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 s 4.1(3).

• ⁵¹ Ibid, see esp s 5.1.

• ⁵² See Impact Assessment Agency of Canada, Canadian Impact Assessment Registry, (6 June 2026) online: <iaac-aeic.gc.ca/evaluations> [perma.cc/J34H-ZPVH]

• ⁵³ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 s 7(b.1).

• ⁵⁴ Ibid, s 7(2.1).

• ⁵⁵ Ibid, see esp s 8.1(1)(e), 8.1(2). See also 8.1(3).

• ⁵⁶ Ibid, s 8.1(3).

• ⁵⁷ Martin Z. Olszynski, “Environmental Assessment as Planning and Disclosure Tool: Greenpeace Canada v Canada (Attorney General)” (2015) 38(1) Dalhousie L J 207 at 221–25.

• ⁵⁸ Supra note [42].

• ⁵⁹ Emergencies Act, RSC, 1985 c 22.

• ⁶⁰ Bill C-5, Building Canada Act, supra note 1 at s 24(3).

• ⁶¹ Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3, at para 71.

• ⁶² Reference re Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23 at para 10, citing J. Benidickson, Environmental Law (5^th ed. 2019), at 257.

• ⁶³ Deborah A Sivas, “Is the National Environmental Policy Act About to be Dramatically Transformed?” (1 December 2024), online (blog): SLS <law.stanford.edu> [perma.cc/C3VV-TUW6].

• ⁶⁴ Michael MacDonald, “Houston Pitches ambitious ‘Wind West’ offshore wind energy project” CBC News, (5 June 2025), online: <cbc.ca/offshore-wind-energy-project> [perma.cc/7YHH-99ZR].

• ⁶⁵ See discussion here Mark Winfield, “Why the federal government must act cautiously on fast-tracking project approvals” The Conversation, (3 June 2025), online: <theconversation.com> [perma.cc/EZ44-B8TV].