1. INTRODUCTION

Vanuatu embodies the nature, reality, complexity, and urgency of climate change. A chain of more than eighty islands in the Southwestern Pacific Ocean, populated by about 300,000 people who are predominantly Indigenous Ni-Vanuatu. Vanuatu’s economy is primarily agricultural, a sector that represents its main source of emissions. Vanuatu’s total greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions for 2022 were approximately 600,000 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt CO₂e).^[1] For context, in the same year, Suncor Energy reported emitting approximately 32,000,000 Mt CO₂e.^[2] The EU’s Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research puts Vanuatu’s contribution to global emissions in 2022 at 0.00 per cent.^[3] For the same year, Suncor’s emission share would have been about 0.06 per cent of global emissions. However, just as Suncor was generating more than $18 billion in adjusted funds and distributing nearly $8 billion to its investors in 2022,^[4] Vanuatu was declaring a climate emergency and ramping up diplomatic push for the United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) to request the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) on the climate obligations of States.^[5]

The climate emergency in Vanuatu has been and remains a serious and ongoing danger. In 2015, the island was struck by Category 5 Tropical Cyclone Pam, destroying or damaging 90 per cent of buildings, impacting 80 per cent of the livelihoods of Indigenous communities, and costing the country about 65 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”).^[6] Within 48 hours in 2023, Vanuatu was hit by two cyclones (tropical cyclones Judy and Kevin) and an earthquake. These affected 80 per cent of the population, with more than one-third of buildings in the country damaged or destroyed.^[7] While climate change did not directly or singularly cause Pam, Judy, or Kevin, it made these cyclones and others like them more frequent, intense, and devastating.^[8] Human emissions have made the earth warmer more quickly than it would have been, with catastrophic effects. Worse still, countries that contributed the least, like Vanuatu, are bearing the brunt of a warming world.

The 2025 advisory opinion of the ICJ is set against the foregoing backdrop.^[9] Vanuatu and other nation-states sought the ICJ’s interpretation of international law on what the obligations of states are to protect the climate system and other parts of the environment from GHG emissions, and the legal consequences for States that have caused significant environmental harm.^[10] The ICJ was established after the Second World War as the primary judicial branch of the United Nations (“UN”). Nation-states granted the court the authority to resolve legal conflicts and provide advisory opinions on international law issues. International law, as interpreted by the ICJ, primarily consists of treaties and binding norms and practices that are widely accepted and recognized as law (customary international law).^[11] While all parties who have ratified a treaty must abide by it, customary international law applies to all nations. For instance, torture is internationally acknowledged as wrongful regardless of whether a country has signed the treaty against torture, just as the international rule against pollution that causes harm in other countries.^[12]

The ICJ’s advisory opinion, in this case, addressed obligations under treaties and customary international law. While advisory opinions are not legally binding in themselves, they serve as authoritative interpretations of treaties and customary law.^[13] Advisory opinions should guide how governments and domestic courts interpret and implement international law. The extant opinion, therefore, provides authoritative guidance on Canada’s climate mitigation and adaptation commitments, its duty to regulate corporate activities, and its obligation to cooperate with other nations to support vulnerable countries under international climate agreements and customary law. This article reviews the obligations as interpreted by the ICJ and their specific implications for Canada. Failure to meet these obligations could make Canada responsible for internationally wrongful acts. Additionally, Canada’s failure to fulfill its climate obligations may be extremely costly, as the country could be legally liable for paying reparations to nations adversely affected by climate change.

2. CLIMATE OBLIGATIONS IN THE ADVISORY OPINION

The climate obligations of States flow from multiple sources, including climate change-specific treaties, non-climate treaties, and customary international law. The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and the 2015 Paris Agreement are the foremost international agreements on climate change. An earlier opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea addressed States’ climate obligations under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.^[14] The decisions made by Parties at various climate conferences could also create legal obligations in some cases.^[15] The Kyoto Protocol, which mandates that developed countries meet specified emission targets, is currently not in effect, as countries have failed to pledge to a further commitment period. Nevertheless, the ICJ held that the Protocol remains relevant as an interpretive aid and for determining whether countries met targets under previous commitment periods.^[16] The 1992 UNFCCC, however, remains extant and State parties to the Convention. The continued substantive relevance of the Convention is vital as it recenters the annex-based obligations, which the Paris Agreement supposedly moved away from.^[17] It is also important, as it continues to serve as an independent legal source of climate obligation for countries, such as the United States, which have withdrawn from the Paris Agreement.

The ICJ also clarified the previously vaguely defined obligations that governments have used to justify inaction on climate change. Canada’s climate obligations extend beyond the Paris Agreement, encompassing customary international law and various international treaties it has ratified, notably the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).

The Paris Agreement, nevertheless, remains the premier international climate treaty. Notably, the court rejected the argument that the Paris Agreement has replaced the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.^[18] The UNFCCC provides the overarching objectives and framework for addressing climate change, which are further specified in subsequent instruments.^[19] These instruments are not incompatible, and they impose similar obligations to varying degrees of detail. The obligations are categorized (mitigation, adaptation, regulation, and cooperation) and briefly discussed below.

The Obligation to Mitigate

In 2015, countries from around the world, including Canada, gathered in Paris, France, and committed to collectively keeping the global temperature below 2°C and striving to limit it to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.^[20] In the years following the Paris agreement, it has become clearer that while a 1.5°C rise leads to increased flooding, drought, heatwaves, and some countries and communities going underwater, a 2°C rise would be significantly worse.^[21] A consensus has therefore emerged among countries committed to the Paris Agreement for a 1.5°C target. In its advisory opinion, the ICJ provided legal backing to the 1.5°C target as the collective goal for nations.^[22] According to the court, this target must guide the commitments and ambitions of states in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions.^[23]

The ICJ’s findings on the mitigation obligations of States were heavily influenced by the definitions and scopes of key concepts, including obligations of conduct and result, the legal implications of verbs such as ‘shall’, ‘will’, ‘would’, and the standard of due diligence. Obligations of result compel States to bring about results required under the obligation, while the obligation of conduct only requires using all means at the State’s disposal to bring about an objective under the obligation.^[24] The distinction between the two obligations, however, is not strict, as both often coexist and seek to achieve similar goals through different means.^[25] The distinction is further blurred as the obligation of conduct entails an obligation to act with due diligence, that is, the duty to utilize all means at a State’s disposal to fulfill its international obligations.^[26] The standard of due diligence, although stringent considering the seriousness of climate change, differs across countries. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (“CBDR”), which requires that climate obligations, rights, and privileges be based on considerations of historical responsibility, capability, and national circumstances, is essential in determining the level of due diligence expected from a country.^[27]

State-parties’ obligation to mitigate includes the legal duty to submit a 1.5°C-compliant nationally determined contribution (“NDC”) containing their climate mitigation (emission reduction) goals every five years (an obligation of result), as well as an obligation to make every effort to achieve those climate goals (an obligation of conduct).^[28] Every country, developed or developing, is obliged to submit an NDC under the Paris Agreement. The ICJ noted that countries do not have untrammelled liberty to decide and communicate emission reduction (climate mitigation) targets that are progressive and represent their “highest possible ambition”.^[29] Countries’ discretion in determining their NDCs is limited and attenuated by basic requirements that NDCs must meet. NDCs must become more ambitious over time, making an adequate contribution to staying within the 1.5°C target, and be presented in a manner that promotes environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability, consistency, and the avoidance of dubious accounting.^[30]

While every country must make efforts to submit ambitious NDCs, the NDCs of developed countries like Canada, considering their historical emissions and current financial and technological capabilities, will be subject to a rigorous application of the requirements set out by the ICJ.^[31] Canada’s current pledge to cut its emissions by 45-50 per cent by 2035, compared to its 2005 levels, is unlikely to meet the ICJ’s standards.^[32] This is especially true, as comparable jurisdictions like the United Kingdom (81 per cent by 2035, compared to 1990) and Norway (70-75 per cent by 2035, compared to 1990) have committed to more ambitious emission reduction targets.^[33] However, even if Canada’s 45-50 per cent emission reduction commitment were accepted, a significant gap remains between the country’s pledge and its policy plans to achieve it. The recent NDC submitted in 2025 is Canada’s third NDC. The country, however, failed to meet the targets committed to under NDCs submitted in 2015 and 2020.^[34] Ambitious NDCs alone do not fulfill the legal climate mitigation obligations of states. Each country must adopt and implement domestic measures adequate to meet its commitments. While countries only have an obligation of conduct — not result — with respect to the targets they have committed to, they must exercise due diligence in fulfilling this obligation.^[35] In other words, while there is no obligation to achieve these targets, they must deploy all appropriate measures and best practices to reach their targets.^[36]

Climate mitigation measures will differ across countries. The Paris Agreement allows NDCs and related instruments to reflect each nation’s circumstances. However, every country should have legislative, administrative, and enforcement mechanisms that effectively enable it to meet its NDCs. Canada’s main climate legislative tools, the Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act (“NZEAA”) and the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (“GGPPA”), arguably do not meet these high standards.^[37] The NZEAA is not action-forcing, and the GGPPA has weakened over time. Canada must now review its climate laws and measures to ensure they align with the requirements set out by the ICJ. Just as Canada’s NDCs must be ambitious and progressive, implementation measures should also be forward-looking and bold.

The One Canadian Economy Act also risks breaching Canada’s climate mitigation commitments if it promotes the development of infrastructure for increased exploration, production, subsidization, and use of fossil fuels.^[38] As clarified by the court, emitting GHGs is not inherently an internationally wrongful act. However, neglecting to take climate-protective measures in relation to fossil fuel activities might be indicative of Canada’s failure to fulfill its climate obligations. Emissions from fossil fuels are the main driver of climate change. Canada cannot meet its climate commitments without addressing this reality in a meaningful way. At a minimum, Canada must have and implement a plan that ensures that developments in the fossil fuel sectors are consistent with its emission reduction targets, which must be ambitious and progressive.

The Obligation to Adapt

Climate change is no longer a distant threat; it is a current reality. A sudden halt to global emissions today would bring significant benefits for future generations. Still, it would not protect the current generation from the already locked-in negative impacts of climate change. For example, one-third of Tuvalu has applied to relocate to Australia as the island gradually disappears into the Pacific.^[39] Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are currently experiencing some of the most severe effects of climate change.^[40] Here at home, permafrost in Canada’s North continues to melt quickly, putting Indigenous communities and residents in danger.^[41]

The reality of adverse impacts from climate change makes climate adaptation a crucial part of international climate law. Climate adaptation measures help individuals and communities prepare for and adjust to the current and expected effects of climate change. Although it receives less attention than climate mitigation in international climate agreements, the ICJ reaffirmed important climate adaptation obligations that Canada and other nations must fulfill.^[42] There is no obligation to commit to specific or quantitative adaptation goals under international law. States must, however, take appropriate measures to strengthen the resilience of their people, communities and infrastructure, reduce their vulnerability to climate change, and improve their ability to adapt.^[43] The ICJ emphasized that the country should make its best efforts towards these goals in line with current scientific knowledge.^[44] While there is no mandatory list of actions, it is arguable that the indicative list in the Paris Agreement — such as having national adaptation plans and assessing climate change impacts and vulnerabilities before approving projects — is a minimum requirement.

Canada’s adaptation strategy has been criticized as inadequate.^[45] There is little meaningful integration of climate adaptation into its regulatory impact assessment framework. The country also falls short on other measures highlighted by the ICJ, including early warning systems, ecosystem restoration, and climate-resilient infrastructure. The level of public knowledge and awareness about place-specific climate impacts. There is also no concerted system to proactively and actively educate and inform Canadians about the vulnerabilities of communities and places to climate change.

Canada lacks a country-wide climate vulnerability map and database comparable to the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Climate Mapping for Resilience and Adaptation (“CMRA”).^[46] The closest equivalent is a Government of Canada website hosting a Quebec climate database with a disclaimer stating that the “resources are not under the control of the Government of Canada.”^[47] The Climate Atlas by the Prairie Climate Center at the University of Manitoba is a very useful tool.^[48] However, public awareness of this platform remains limited. Its comprehensiveness, accessibility, and user-friendliness are also questionable. Provinces, particularly in the Atlantic region, as well as several Indigenous bodies, have developed adaptation plans and strategies.^[49] Nonetheless, there is no meaningful coordination among provincial and federal adaptation plans and strategies. The legal framework for climate adaptation at both federal and provincial levels is currently highly fragmented and mostly only implicitly relevant to climate adaptation and resilience.

The Obligations to Regulate and Cooperate

Failing to properly regulate the actions of companies that contribute to climate change could make Canada liable for an international wrongful act. Traditionally, international law has focused on the obligations and actions of states. As a result, companies are generally considered to have no obligations under international law. However, the trend in Canada and other countries has shifted. The Supreme Court of Canada, for instance, has decided that a company could be held liable for human rights abuses under customary international law.^[50] In other countries, courts have used international climate agreements to establish the climate responsibilities of corporations.^[51]

Although the ICJ stopped short of ruling that corporate entities have direct climate obligations under international law, it stated that failing to regulate their activities could indicate a state’s failure to fulfill its climate commitments.^[52] It may also suggest that a State is not complying with its duty under customary international law to prevent significant environmental harm.^[53] Consequently, States must establish regulatory mechanisms that bind both public and private entities under their control to achieve deep, rapid, and sustained reductions in emissions and to minimize climate-related risks. Additionally, systems for monitoring and enforcement are essential. Although Canada has laws and policies at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels regulating corporate emissions, it lacks the comprehensive climate change due diligence regulatory framework present in other countries.^[54] Impact assessment is also important in this context. According to the ICJ, States should provide and carry out impact assessments regarding how projects within their jurisdiction or control contribute to GHG emissions, using the best available science.^[55] Impact assessment is an indicator that a country is making its best efforts to meet its climate obligations under international customary law.

Climate change cannot be dealt with by the efforts of any single country, no matter how ambitious. Global emissions collectively contribute to climate change, and their impacts do not respect borders. The ICJ describes the climate system as a shared resource belonging to all states.^[56] It is a matter of common concern for humankind that requires international cooperation. Climate agreements, including the Paris Agreement, acknowledge the vital importance of countries working together to fight climate change.

The need for cooperation becomes even more essential, especially since the emissions-intensive industrialization of countries like Canada has significantly contributed to climate change, with its worst impacts felt disproportionately by countries with the least emissions.^[57] That is why supporting emission reduction and adaptation efforts in developing nations is a vital part of every international climate agreement. However, the obligation to cooperate extends beyond international agreements, as it is also a customary international law norm. Even if a country is not a signatory to an international climate treaty, it still bears a duty to make good faith efforts to collaborate with other nations to combat climate change.^[58]

Good faith and understanding are vital to the duty to cooperate. They recognize the interdependence of States and the importance of each nation genuinely contributing its fair share. Fair burden sharing and responsibility are essential. According to the ICJ, the duty to cooperate and prevent significant environmental harm is a legal standard used to evaluate whether international agreements and their implementation meet their objectives and whether additional collective actions are needed.^[59] Canada has an obligation, considering its historical emissions, current capabilities, and circumstances, to commit to emission targets that fairly reflect its burden. It has been estimated that Canada’s fair contribution to the global temperature goal should be a 140 per cent reduction by 2030, including at least a 60 per cent domestic emission reduction and the rest through support for developing countries.^[60]

Although countries can choose their mode of cooperation, refusing to cooperate is not an option. The court also acknowledged that financial assistance, technology transfer, and capacity building are primary forms of collaboration.^[61] As a developed nation, Canada has a duty to provide and support financial aid, technology transfer, and capacity development to developing countries in line with the 1.5°C target. Canada is behind in delivering international support to developing countries, with its climate finance contributions currently considered highly insufficient.^[62]

3. IMPLICATIONS OF ADVISORY OPINION FOR CLIMATE LITIGATION IN CANADA

The advisory opinion of the ICJ does not bind Canadian courts. Such opinion could, however, be “compelling” to Canadian courts,^[63] particularly in their determination of the scope of the obligations of the federal government, provinces, municipalities, and private actors under international law. The existing ICJ opinion may not necessarily alter the trajectory of judicial decisions radically. Its most significant impact might be in the implications of its component parts for discrete issues. In a sense, the parts might be of greater consequence than the whole.

One of the understated yet most consequential findings of the ICJ is its full-throated grounding of the obligations of States in respect of climate change in customary international law. This is important not only because it is the first time the argument received judicial approval, but also more significantly because such grounding extends climate obligations beyond States that are parties to climate treaties. Countries that withdraw from international climate agreements remain obligated under customary international law. The argument can, however, be taken even further, drawing on the universality of customary international law. The ICJ did not address the climate obligations of sub-State units and private actors.

While the general rule under international law is that the State is liable for the wrongful acts of its sub-State units and private actors, the decision of the SCC in Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya makes it possible to hold non-State entities liable under customary international law directly. After reviewing a long line of cases, the court concluded that “Canada has followed the conventional path of automatically incorporating customary international law into domestic law via the doctrine of adoption, making it part of the common law of Canada in the absence of conflicting legislation”.^[64] This reasoning allowed the court to conclude that a private actor can be held accountable under customary international law. Similarly, private actors and sub-State units in Canada have an obligation under customary international law to prevent significant harm to the environment, including the climate system. So far, direct climate litigation against private actors in Canada has been rare, and most cases against federal and provincial governments have been based on the Charter. There is now a real possibility that a viable claim under customary international law can now be made against private actors and sub-national units.

The advisory opinion is also relevant for more recent reference case initiated by Alberta against the Impact Assessment Act.^[65] In the first Impact Assessment Act Reference, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal IAA was beyond Parliament’s legislative authority because the Act insufficiently focused on areas of federal jurisdiction.^[66] In part, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) found that by using broad considerations like effects of projects on Canada’s climate commitments to substantiate a negative public interest decision, the law lost its focus on regulating federal impacts.^[67] Canada subsequently amended the Act, but Alberta was unsatisfied with those changes and referred the amended Act to another reference before the Alberta Court of Appeal.

With respect to transboundary environmental harm specifically, the SCC in the first IAA Reference constrained prior precedents to establishing federal jurisdiction over marine pollution, transboundary river pollution, and national standards of carbon pricing, not transboundary air pollution per se.^[68] The ICJ has, however, highlighted impact assessment as a due diligence requirement for fulfilling Canada’s duty to prevent significant harm to the climate system.^[69] While an opinion of the ICJ does not alter the constitutionally established distribution of power in Canada, it certainly seems clearer now that Canada has an international obligation to assess projects’ GHG emissions that the federal and provincial governments will have to meet.

Canadian courts may find the ICJ’s opinion that climate change can impact rights such as life, health, and privacy under international human rights treaties, to which Canada is a signatory, compelling in their determination of climate rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.^[70] Courts around the world, including in the United States, have to varying degrees reached positive findings on the existence and violation of climate rights either under their constitution or under the law of tort.^[71] So far, no Canadian court has. The most promising climate right case in Canada, as of the time of writing, Mathur v Ontario has returned to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice after the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of trial court rejecting the claims of litigants under sections 7 (right to life, liberty and security) and 15 (equality rights) of the Charter.^[72] The trial court found it difficult to accommodate climate rights within the traditional scopes of sections 7 and 15.^[73]

The ICJ’s determination that core human rights treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), and rights under international customary law, form part of the most directly relevant applicable law in the climate context,^[74] should compel Canadian courts to rescope the bounds of Charter rights accordingly. This argument is consistent with the firmly established interpretive principle that “the Charter is presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights that Canada has ratified”.^[75] It is worth noting that Canada has ratified the ICCPR, ICESCR, and other relevant human rights treaties like the Convention on the Rights of the Child; treaties that the ICJ held to include protection for climate rights.

Further, the common argument that governments or private actors cannot be legally responsible for climate change because climate harm cannot be directly linked to their actions has been weakened by the ICJ. The court clarified that attribution — the responsibility for failing to meet climate obligations — differs from causation, which pertains to liability for the harm caused by climate change.^[76] Attribution alone suffices to establish responsibility for an international wrongful act under treaties and international customary law. Legal consequences, including the duties of performance, cessation, and guarantees of non-repetition, can arise if attribution is proven without more. Causation is only relevant if reparation (including compensation, restitution, and satisfaction) is claimed. Notably, the court rejected the idea that States cannot be held liable for climate-related harm requiring reparations, even though proving causation remains challenging.^[77] This finding will potentially open a new frontier of reparation claims against Canada, provinces, and potentially, private actors by people and communities suffering the worst impacts of climate change, including Canadian Indigenous communities, as confirmed by the SCC in the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act Reference and vulnerable countries like Vanuatu.^[78]

4. CONCLUSION

To the realist, international law is the law of the powerful by the powerful for the powerful. Powerful countries ignore it freely, while weaker nations can be compelled into obedience. In an ideal world, every country should consider the opinion of the ICJ to review, set higher ambitions, and implement its climate laws and policies in good faith. Every nation, whether or not it is a party to an international climate agreement, should pass laws, adopt policies, and take actions to protect a deteriorating climate. This is because the duty to safeguard the climate is rooted not only in treaties but also in the core practices and norms that are believed to bind every country. These norms include a responsibility to ensure that activities in one country do not harm another, to cooperate in protecting global spaces over which no single State holds exclusive jurisdiction, and to ensure that the integrity of the climate system is protected.

The world is far from ideal, and as the ICJ acknowledged, there are limits to international law.^[79] As the impacts of climate change grow more severe in Canada and countries like Vanuatu through wildfires, cyclones, heatwaves, and flooding, causing loss of life, livelihoods, and ecosystems, levels of government in Canada have engaged in unnecessary jurisdictional disputes and consistently weaken already insufficient climate policies and laws. The ICJ’s opinion is not a cure-all, but it is an important step forward. Its effectiveness depends on human will and wisdom, as the court pointed out, to make tough choices for protecting our planet and future generations. Hopefully, Canada and its people will see this decision, made by 15 individuals from around the world, as a call to unite our collective resolve and wisdom in halting our rapid slide into disaster.

• * Adebayo Majekolagbe is an Assistant Professor at the University of Alberta’s Faculty of Law. He has over a decade of post-call legal experience and has appeared at all levels of the Nigerian judicial system. He holds Master of Laws degrees from the University of Lagos, Nigeria, and Dalhousie University, Canada. He also earned a PhD from the Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University. Adebayo is a fellow of the Marine and Environmental Law Institute at Dalhousie University and a member of the International Association for Impact Assessment. He has researched and published on topics related to just transition, impact assessment, sustainability, climate change law, and human rights. Additionally, he teaches courses at the University of Alberta’s Faculty of Law, including climate change law, environmental law, and constitutional law.

  ¹ European Commission, GHG Emissions of All World Countries, (Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research, 2023), online: <edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/report_2023> [European Commission].

• ² Open Sustainability Index, “Suncor Energy” (2022), online: <opensustainabilityindex.org/company/suncor-energy>.

• ³ European Commission, supra note 1.

• ⁴ Suncor, Annual Report (Suncor, 2022) 2, online (pdf): <suncor.com/-/media/project/suncor/files/investor-centre/annual-report-2023/2023-annual-report-en.pdf?modified=20240613203824&created=20240321155537>.

• ⁵ Government of Vanuatu, Department of Climate Change, “Declaration of Climate Emergency Approved Unanimously by the Parliament of Vanuatu” (2022), online: <docc.gov.vu/index.php/resources/news-events/news/120-declaration-of-climate-emergency-approved-unanimously-by-the-parliament-of-vanuatu>.

• ⁶ “Cyclone Pam destroyed 90% of buildings in Vanuatu, says president – video”, The Guardian (16 March 2015), online: <theguardian.com/world/video/2015/mar/16/cyclone-pam-vanuatu-president-video>; Julie Webb et al, “Does Gender Responsive Disaster Risk Reduction Make a Difference?: A Comparative Study of Category Five Tropical Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu” (2017) Care, online (pdf): <sistalibrary.com.vu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/CARE_Vanuatu_DRR_Impact_Study.pdf>.

• ⁷ Government of Australia, “A Triple Disaster Event Series in Vanuatu: Cascading and Compounding Impacts of Climate Change” (2023) <unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/casestudy_australia_vanuatu_cascadingcoumpounding.pdf>.

• ⁸ Roz Pidcock, “Cyclone Pam: Untangling the Complex Science on Tropical Storms and Climate Change” (16 March 2015), online: <carbonbrief.org/cyclone-pam-untangling-the-complex-science-on-tropical-storms-and-climate-change>; Sanjay Srivastava & Sudip Ranjan Basu, “Vanuatu Twin Cyclones Underscore Pacific’s Vulnerability to Climate Risks” (16 March 2023) online: <sdg.iisd.org/commentary/guest-articles/vanuatu-twin-cyclones-underscore-pacifics-vulnerability-to-climate-risks>.

• ⁹ Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, Advisory Opinion, [2025] ICJ Rep 187.

• ¹⁰ Vanuatu ICJ Initiative, UNGA, 22 Sess, UN Doc A/70 (2023) GA Res 77/276.

• ¹¹ Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7 (entered into force 24 October 1945), art 38.

• ¹² Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-t101, Judgement on Trial Chamber (10 Dec 1998) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online (pdf): <icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf>.

• ¹³ “Contrary to judgments and except in rare cases where it is expressly provided that they shall have binding force, …the court’s advisory opinions are not binding. The requesting organ, agency or organization remains free to decide, as it sees fit, what effect to give to these opinions. Despite having no binding force, the Court’s advisory opinions nevertheless carry great weight and moral authority…[they] contribute to the clarification and development of International law and thereby to the strengthening of peaceful relations between States” (International Court of Justice, “Advisory Jurisdiction” (last visited 6 October 2025), online: <icj-cij.org/advisory-jurisdiction>).

• ¹⁴ Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (2024), Advisory Opinion, No 31, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

• ¹⁵ “The Court observes that in certain circumstances the decisions of these bodies have certain legal effects. First, when the treaty so provides, the decision of COP may create legally binding obligations for the parties… Second, decisions of these bodies…[can] be taken into account as means of interpreting the climate change treaties” (ibid at para 184).

• ¹⁶ Ibid at para 221.

• ¹⁷ Under the UNFCCC, annexe I countries are developed countries with obligations to adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on climate change mitigation (See UNFCCC, art 4(2)(a)), while annex II countries must go further to provide support to developing countries (see UNFCCC, art 4(3)). Canada is both an annex I and II country (see UNFCCC, Annexes I and II). See also ibid at para 199.

• ¹⁸ Supra note 14 at para 189.

• ¹⁹ Ibid at para 195.

• ²⁰ Paris Agreement, being an Annex to the Report of the Conference of the parties on its twenty-first session, held in parties from 30 November to 13 December 2015 – Addendum Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the parties at its twenty-first session, 12 December 2015, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 55 ILM 740 (entered into force 5 October 2016, accession by Canada 4 November 2016) , art 2(1)(a) [Paris Agreement].

• ²¹ Masson-Delmotte, V. et al, Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

• ²² Supra note 14 at at para 224.

• ²³ Ibid at para 242.

• ²⁴ Ibid at para 208.

• ²⁵ Ibid at para 175.

• ²⁶ Ibid at para 176.

• ²⁷ Ibid at para 247.

• ²⁸ Paris Agreement, supra note 20 art 4(2).

• ²⁹ Supra note 14, at paras 245–46.

• ³⁰ Ibid at paras 241–44.

• ³¹ Ibid at para 247.

• ³² Government of Canada, “Canada’s 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution” (June 2025), online (pdf): <unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Canada%27s%202035%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution_ENc.pdf>.

• ³³ Government of United Kingdom, “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Norther Ireland’s 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution” (January 2025), online (pdf): <assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/679b5ee8413ef177de146c1e/uk-2035-nationally-determined-contribution.pdf>; Government of Norway, “Norway’s Nationally Determined Contribution 2035” (June 2025), online (pdf): <unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2025-06/Norways%20NDC%20for%202035..pdf>.

• ³⁴ Office of the Auditor General of Canada, “Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act – 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan” (2023) Report 6 – Reports of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, online (pdf): <oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_cesd_202311_06_e.pdf>.

• ³⁵ Supra note 14 at para 251.

• ³⁶ Ibid at paras 252–53.

• ³⁷ Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act, SC 2021 c 22; Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, SC 2018 c 12.

• ³⁸ One Canadian Economy Act, SC 2025 c 5; Supra note 14 at para 427.

• ³⁹ Angus Watson, “More than a third of this country’s population has applied to relocate” (27 June 2025) CNN World, online: <edition.cnn.com/2025/06/27/australia/tuvalu-relocation-visa-australia-climate-intl-hnk>.

• ⁴⁰ World Meteorological Organization, “Africa faces disproportionate burden from climate change and adaptation costs” (2 September 2024) online: <wmo.int/news/media-centre/africa-faces-disproportionate-burden-from-climate-change-and-adaptation-costs>.

• ⁴¹ Firelight Research Inc. & Canadian Climate Institute, The Impacts of Permafrost Thaw on Northern Indigenous Communities (Vancouver, Canadian Climate Institute, 2022).

• ⁴² Supra note 14 at para 255.

• ⁴³ Ibid at para 256.

• ⁴⁴ Ibid at para 258.

• ⁴⁵ Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Canada’s strategy for adapting to climate change lacks key elements and progress, (Ottawa, Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the Parliament of Canada, 2025).

• ⁴⁶ U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, “Climate Mapping for Resilience and Adaptation”, online: <resilience.climate.gov>.

• ⁴⁷ Government of Canada, “Vulnerability to Climate Change” (31 July 2017), online: <open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/3603f75a-1963-4130-9fc5-ab3e7272211a>.

• ⁴⁸ Climate Atlas of Canada, (last visited 15 October 2025), online: <climateatlas.ca>.

• ⁴⁹ David L. VanderZwaag et al, “Canada and Ocean Climate Adaptation: Tracking Law and Policy Responses, Charting future Directions” (2023) 10:1 Frontiers in Marine Science 1.

• ⁵⁰ Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya, 2020 SCC 5 [Nevsun].

• ⁵¹ Civiel recht, Rechtbank Den Haag [District Court of The Hague, Civil Division], 26 May 2021, Milieudefensie et al v Royal Dutch Shell plc, No C/09/571932 / HA ZA 19-379 (Netherlands).

• ⁵² Supra note 14 at para 428.

• ⁵³ Ibid at 282.

• ⁵⁴ See for example, French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law (2017).

• ⁵⁵ Supra note 14 at para 298.

• ⁵⁶ Ibid at para 302.

• ⁵⁷ Ruma Bhargawa and Megha Bhargava, “The climate crisis disproportionately hits the poor. How can we protect them?” (13 January 2023), online: weforum.org/stories/2023/01/climate-crisis-poor-davos2023.

• ⁵⁸ Supra note 14 at para 304.

• ⁵⁹ Ibid at para 307.

• ⁶⁰ Climate Action Network, “Canada’s Climate Fair Share” (2019), online (pdf): <climateactionnetwork.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Canada-Fair-Share-Infographic.pdf>.

• ⁶¹ Supra note 14 at para 306.

• ⁶² Climate Action Tracker, “Canada: Country summary” (last visited 15 October 2025), online: <climateactiontracker.org/countries/canada/#:~:text=Canada’s%20international%20public%20climate%20finance,Land%20use%20&%20forestry%20Source%20&%20Sink>.

• ⁶³ Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982 at para 67. [“Similarly, other sources of international law may be relevant in a court’s determination of whether an act falls within Article 1F(c). For example, determinations by the International Court of Justice may be compelling”].

• ⁶⁴ Nevsun, supra note 49 at para 90.

• ⁶⁵ Reference re Impact Assessment Act (Canada), 2022 CanLII 165 (ABCA).

• ⁶⁶ Reference re Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23.

• ⁶⁷ Ibid at para 178.

• ⁶⁸ Supra note 14 at paras 182–89.

• ⁶⁹ Ibid at paras 295–98.

• ⁷⁰ Ibid at paras 376–93.

• ⁷¹ Supra note 51; Held v State of Montana, 312 MT MT 312 (Mont S Ct 2024) DA 23-0575; Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], 24 March 2021, Neubauer et al v Germany, No 2656/18 (Germany).

• ⁷² Mathur v Ontario, 2024 CanLII 762 (ONCA).

• ⁷³ Mathur v His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, 2023 CanLII 2316 (ONSC).

• ⁷⁴ Supra note 14 at para 145.

• ⁷⁵ Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 SCR 313 at para 59; Quebec (AG) v 9147-0732 Québec Inc., 2020 SCC 32 at para 31.

• ⁷⁶ Supra note 14 at para 422.

• ⁷⁷ Ibid at paras 433–38.

• ⁷⁸ Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11 at paras 11–12.

• ⁷⁹ Supra note 14 at para 456.