INTRODUCTION

This paper provides a commentary on the Canada’s Energy Future (EF2023)^[1] report issued by the Canada Energy Regulator (CER).

Using economic and energy models, the report, one of a series, “explores how possible energy futures might unfold for Canadians over the long-term” and specifically focusses “on the challenge of achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.”^[2]

“In this analysis, we begin with the end goal in mind: net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2050, and use our models to identify pathways to that point. This is a different approach compared to past versions of the report where we ran our models without restrictions, giving us insights into what a given premise meant for the future.

In this report we explore a key question about Canada’s energy future: what could reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 look like? This report is not a prediction or a recommendation. It presents net-zero scenarios that can help Canadians and policy makers see what a net-zero world could look like, visualize the goal, and make informed decisions.”^[3]

FIRST, SOME HISTORY

Before attempting to discuss the report, it is useful to review not only its genesis and context but that of the CER itself.

The predecessor to the CER, the National Energy Board (NEB), established in 1959 under the National Energy Board Act, was authorized to regulate the export of oil, natural gas and electricity, the import of gas and, significantly, to oversee, the construction and operation of interprovincial and international pipelines including the setting of tolls and tariffs for those projects. The Board, composed of independent members appointed by Governor-in-Council, had all the powers vested in a superior court (a “court of record”) and reported to Parliament through the Minister of Natural Resources.

The events that surrounded the formation of the NEB were not unremarkable. The “Great Pipeline Debate” held in Parliament in May and June 1956 became one of the most significant confrontations in Canadian parliamentary history. The Liberal government of the day proposed to have constructed, in the national interest, a pipeline to carry natural gas from Alberta into central Canada. Requiring significant capital expenditures, in 1954 then-Minister C.D. Howe called for the formation of a private syndicate to create TransCanada Pipelines, having introduced a Bill to authorize it with provisions, introduced in May 1956 that provided a loan to support construction. A political storm ensued which led the government to introduce a time limit on debate through closure – a legislative procedure used to address the urgent need to begin pipeline construction that year. With the Liberal majority in the House, the Bill passed. However, the debate so coloured views within the electorate that it was considered, in whole or in part, to have led to the defeat of the Liberal government in the 1957 Canadian general election, one that ended more than two decades of Liberal governments.

Fast-forward to the 2015 Canadian general election, one that arrived at a time of unprecedented protests over proposed pipeline construction applications, when Liberal candidate Justin Trudeau vowed to “reform” and “modernize” the National Energy Board and, significantly, promised not to allow pending pipeline applications to proceed. During the election, Trudeau made these attacks on the regulatory process and the NEB a core element of his campaign:

“It’s obvious the Harper government’s politicization of the National Energy Board, the process around approval for projects like this, is not working, and if there’s any hope for projects like this and others to go forward, there needs to be a restoration of public trust. That’s why we’ve announced we’re going to engage in a new, open process for all pipelines.”^[4]

The campaign also made explicit promises to restructure the NEB and to “re-do” the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline expansion from Alberta to B.C. to ensure:

“….environmental assessments include an analysis of upstream impacts and greenhouse-gas emissions resulting from projects under review.”^[5]

Unlike the Parliamentary debates of 1956 that preceded an election, it was the 2015 election itself that focussed direct attention on pipelines and the NEB. In effect, it was being alleged that the independence of the NEB had been politically compromised to such a degree that public trust in national interest decisions had been eroded and therefore required material legislative and administrative changes.

The subsequent Liberal government’s 2015 mandate letter to Natural Resources Minister Jim Carr carried direction to:

“Modernize the National Energy Board to ensure that its composition reflects regional views and has sufficient expertise in fields such as environmental science, community development and indigenous traditional knowledge.”^[6]

It did not help the NEB that, shortly after the 2015 election, a scandal erupted over meetings held by certain NEB Members and political leaders in Quebec with alleged ties to the Energy East Consortium. This gave new impetus to modernize the NEB, as reflected in a 2016 statement from NRCan Minister Carr when the Energy East Hearing was suspended:

“Canadians expect and deserve to have confidence in their public institutions. Independence and neutrality are fundamental principles for all of Canada’s regulatory institutions, including those reviewing major projects such as the National Energy Board (NEB). Canadians expect all regulatory institutions to address claims that the principles of independence and neutrality are not being respected.

We are modernizing the NEB to restore the trust that Canadians want, and we will be reviewing the NEB’s mandate, structure and role, including public participation in the regulatory reviews.

We hope the situation involving the Energy East hearings will be resolved immediately to allow the process to continue so Canadians can voice their point of view on this important national topic.”^[7]

The eventual cancellation by the proponent in October 2017 of the proposed $15.7 billion Energy East Pipeline Project^[8] was unquestionably a result of a complex series of events,^[9] some of which embraced not just Canadian regulatory uncertainty, but changed economics, opposition from Quebec and organised, vocal opposition from environmental organizations and numerous First Nations.

These events set off a cascade of activities by the new Federal government as it proceeded to form an Expert Panel on the Modernization of the National Energy Board leading to a NEB Expert Panel Report^[10] released on May 2017. As extensively reviewed by Professor Banks^[11], the Expert Panel Report was one of four that examined aspects of how the federal government reviews and regulates major projects. Three other reports dealt with a review of environmental assessment procedures, habitat protection under the Fisheries Act and the role of the Navigation Protection Act. In June 2017, the Federal Government released a discussion paper “Environmental and Regulatory Reviews”^[12] that outlined certain, broad proposed changes for federal assessment and regulatory processes, these in response to the earlier-cited reports.

For almost 60 years the National Energy Board (NEB) had assumed legislative responsibilities for the regulation of approximately 73,000 kilometres of international and interprovincial pipelines 1,400 kilometres of international power lines and for the import and export of energy in Canada. All of that was about to change – significantly.

As noted in a Federal announcement about the unfolding processes:

“As Canadians made clear during 14 months of extensive public consultations, our federal energy regulations must continue to evolve and adapt to changing times. Canadians had diverse recommendations on reforms, but all agreed these efforts are central to integrating Canada’s energy, economic and climate goals, as well as renewing Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples. A modern regulator is also critical to ensuring Canadians continue to have access to a safe, affordable and reliable supply of energy.”^[13]

Those “extensive public consultations” were marked by widespread protests, especially in western Canada, during which time Bill C-69 became known as the “no more pipelines Act.” Nonetheless, on June 20, 2019 Bill C-69 was passed into law^[14] following sometimes acrimonious hearings held by the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, chaired by Senator Rosa Galvez^[15]. Many sessions were accompanied by strong opposition and vocal protests.^[16]

Bill C-69 enacting the Impact Assessment Act, the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, and amending the Navigation Protection Act (renamed as the Canadian Navigable Waters Act) was passed by a final vote of 57–37 and received Royal Assent shortly thereafter. Although the Senate recommended 188 amendments to the Bill, the House of Commons chose to accept only 62 amendments with another 37 agreed after alterations. Notwithstanding these amendments, the final version of the Bill passed by the Senate largely resembled the version originally tabled by the Federal Government in the House of Commons on February 8, 2018.

Following a process that perhaps surpassed the public and political rancor witnessed in the 1956 Great Pipeline Debate, Liberal electoral promises were fulfilled when the CER was formed on August 28, 2019 under the Canadian Energy Regulator Act (CER Act).

Significantly, in its stated attempt to “modernize” the NEB, the CER Act emphasised Indigenous participation, sustainability, climate change and new criteria for regulatory decisions. However, as asserted not just by industry, the Act increased the level of investment uncertainty already associated with a protracted Canadian Federal assessment process. This raised the valid question as to whether or not Bill C-69 would achieve its primary objective to provide more efficient and timely regulatory decision-making. Indeed, many considered that the requirements of the Act would place the new CER in a difficult position in future considerations of the public interest, especially those associated with large interprovincial pipelines, or carbon-emitting, resource projects. However, in light of subsequent decisions made by Cabinet on November 29, 2016 to officially reject plans for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline^[17] project, it was clear that the long-standing governing principle of the NEB that “those who hear the evidence decide” had effectively been abandoned.

At the end of the day, the Canadian Energy Regulator Act had created the new Canada Energy Regulator and successfully repealed the National Energy Board Act. It was the end of an era.

WHAT DID “MODERNIZATION” ACCOMPLISH?

Although the CER arrived in 2019 through a process vastly different from that which had led to the creation of the NEB in 1959, its birth was nonetheless equally as traumatic.^[18] Different from 1959 was the emergence of well-funded environmental activist organizations that appeared to extensively employ social media to form a vocal, highly effective voice that targeted not just the NEB, its Permanent Members and their regulatory decisions, but the entire Canadian oil, gas and pipeline sector.^[19] These alleged activities led to the creation of an Alberta public enquiry into anti-Alberta energy campaigns that attempted to reveal funding from foreign special interest groups.^[20]

After what has been described as a “great run”^[21] that extended over almost six decades, the NEB had been “modernized.” That structural alteration had material legislative and administrative consequences which elicited concern from some quarters.^[22] Notably, the CER’s adjudicative function was separated from its administrative operations through the creation of a Board of Directors set to provide oversight, strategic direction and advice on operations. With a Chief Executive Officer, separate from the Chair of the Board, responsibilities for day-to-day operations now rest with the CEO. The CER’s adjudicative branch has up to seven full-time commissioners who replaced the NEB’s nine Permanent Board Members. At least one of the CER’s directors and at least one of the Commissioners was specified to be of Indigenous ancestry.

While the mandate for the CER included traditional NEB regulatory concerns such as decisions for pipelines (including abandoned pipelines), power lines, offshore renewable energy and also the oversight of pipeline construction, operation and abandonment, it did not include impact assessment or consultations on major projects. These tasks were assigned to the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada (IAAC), a central agency for impact assessment and consultations not just for the CER but also for other lifecycle regulators.

THE CER AND ITS ENERGY FUTURE 2023 REPORT

The 2023 CER report (EF2023) provided some insight into its new directions:

“In this analysis, we begin with the end goal in mind: net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2050 and use our models to identify pathways to that point. This is a different approach compared to past versions of the report where we ran our models without restrictions, giving us insights into what a given premise meant for the future.

In this report we explore a key question about Canada’s energy future: what could reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 look like? This report is not a prediction or a recommendation. It presents net-zero scenarios that can help Canadians and policy makers see what a net-zero world could look like, visualize the goal, and make informed decisions.” [emphasis added]^[23]

A primary concern for any independent regulator is to avoid the potential of “regulatory capture”^[24] from agents within its regulated community. But what happens when regulatory capture appears to emanate from government itself? Alignment by line departments with governmental policy priorities has always been a standard operating principle. Indeed, the Liberal government has been restructuring Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) to, among other things, attain “meaningful Indigenous participation in natural resources projects and net-zero transition.”^[25] However, there are material consequences that arise when such directives are applied to what was formerly an independent, expert energy and pipeline tribunal notably when, under Ministerial direction, the CER was directed to consider the “end goals” of governmental policy.

Investors, analysts, and policy makers had come to rely upon the NEB for fact-based, independent analyses of the national interest untainted by either governmental policy direction or the direct economic interests of industry. The 2023 CER report on Canada’s energy future stands all those principles on their head by uncritically assuming that Federal policies to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 are not only desirable but technically and economically feasible.

The three scenarios considered by the CER are a significant departure from prior analyses done by the NEB because they incorporate, as a first assumption, a “net-zero baseline” into the long-term outlook for the Canadian energy industry. Unsurprisingly, the report assumes that targets for net-zero greenhouse gas emissions reductions set out in the Paris Agreement^[26] will be successful and result in Canadian oil production materially declining by 2050. This assumption flies in the face of the growing evidence of substantial disagreements within the G20 group of nations (who account for three-quarters of international GDP and global emissions) who have consistently failed to reach consensus to phase down fossil fuels.^[27] In addition to objections from some producer nations within the G20 group, there are clear indications that substantive producer^[28] and consumer^[29] nations like Russia, India, Indonesia and China are moving in directions that would negate any Canadian, and perhaps all G20 group, emissions reductions. Hence, many consider that the attainment of “net-zero” should be considered more as an aspiration than as a feasible policy based on realistic engineering or economics.

In constructing a report “with the end-goal in mind,” the CER appears to have by-passed an essential requirement as an expert agency first to assess the validity of the fundamental assumptions that underpin the modelling. One could question if many of the report’s assumptions and findings were critically reviewed before those assumptions about net-zero scenarios were accepted: “…to help Canadians and policymakers see what a net-zero world could look like.”^[30]

In contrast, previous reports from the CER helpfully assessed projects that have the potential to increase Alberta’s ccs carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) capacity to 56 million tonnes CO₂/year by 2030 – equivalent to 22 per cent of the 256.5 million tonnes CO₂ emitted in the province in 2020.^[31] By contrast, CER’s EF2023 report models scenarios for net-zero that do not critically assess the global efforts needed to achieve international net-zero targets. It also omits careful consideration of the importance of establishing fiscal certainty for industry before significant investments could be made in CCS technologies.^[32]

It may be useful to recall that the genesis for the CER report was in response to certain criticisms^[33] voiced by the Minister and climate advocates in regard to the CER’s 2021 Annual Report^[34] that projected Canadian oil and gas production could increase until 2032–2040. One commentator noted the inconsistency between the CER and the IEA’s approach to forecasting: “We need to make sure that this is the last year that our energy regulator can get away with energy forecasting that sets us up for failure.”^[35]

Subjected to these criticisms, in December 2021 NRCan Minister Wilkinson:

“…requested that the CER produce a report that would undertake a scenario analysis consistent with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and with Canada achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. This report was to include modelled scenarios relating to the supply and demand of all energy commodities. EF2023 is the result of that request.” [emphasis added]^[36]

In response to the Minister’s letter of request dated December 16, 2021^[37] the CER confirmed that its next report iteration would be “expanded to include modelling consistent with Canada’s commitment to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.”^[38] It could be argued that there is an additional role for the CER – that being to provide a critical assessment of consequences of this “commitment.” In light of developing real-world concerns, such as energy security and the economic and financial challenges associated with the attainment of net-zero policies, would it not have been reasonable to expect any national regulator also to consider the potential material effect of these policies for the Canadian national interest?

CONCLUDING COMMENTARY

In light of the NEB’s acclaimed prior independence for regulatory decisions and analysis, these events marked a significant departure from past practices and shifted the Regulator toward activities traditionally addressed by line departments. Many would consider that any regulator directed by Ministers to respond to public pressures from advocacy groups would have suffered a serious diminishment of its image for independent thought and analysis.

In a critical review Stewart Muir noted:

“There’s nothing wrong with ambitious blue-sky thinking on what the world should look like in a quarter century. But providing the boring statistics of energy system performance as it exists in the moment is also still important. A national energy regulator insulated by design from the whims of political actors should be able to walk and chew gum — but it feels like somebody has instructed it not to try.

In its particulars, the new report misses crucial details. For instance, it overlooks Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which allows countries to transfer carbon credits earned from the reduction of GHG emissions to help others meet climate targets. This could significantly enhance the prospects for low-emission LNG exports from Canada. Similarly, the report overlooks two LNG projects, both owned by First Nations, that are moving through the regulatory process. Considering all the other assumptions the report entertains, it could have assumed Cedar LNG and Ksi Lsims LNG might well come to fruition. When built, these projects could significantly improve Canada’s decarbonization story, but they are nowhere in the plan.”^[39]

Significantly Muir also acknowledged an important contribution of the report:

“The report isn’t without merit. The inclusion of discussions around carbon capture, nuclear power, and hydrogen is commendable. Many climate warriors are dead set against these technologies, insisting instead on total reliance on renewables. Kudos to the CER for standing its ground on them. Its doing so gives hope discussions about transition may be guided by a realistic understanding of our energy-intensive civilization, not just wishful thinking.”^[40]

Arguably, assessments of the national interest should be based on more factors than the attainment of reduced emissions. It requires consideration of viable, economic and feasible methodologies for a “transitional” energy economy to maintain, or enhance, our standard of living. This is especially so when a significant proportion of the global energy economy appears to be headed in directions that make achievement of a global net-zero economy highly problematic.^[41]

Notwithstanding Canada’s^[42] and the parallel international consensus for industrialized democracies to “transition” away from fossil fuels, as was demonstrated by the recent Group of 7 meetings in Hiroshima, Japan there continue to be material difficulties experienced in attaining such targets.^[43] The final G7 communiqué^[44] acknowledged the need for continued financing by Japan for some coal-fired power plants, while others, such as Germany, continue to support investment in natural gas infrastructure required to replace Russian gas imports.

Significantly, a recent report by the US Institute for Energy Research concluded:

“Achieving any of the net-zero pathways in Net-Zero America requires heroic assumptions about land use, coal use, sales of electric vehicles (EVs), and construction of new generation and infrastructure. Achieving any one of these assumed target values would require massive, unprecedented, and rapid change. Hitting net-zero would require all these unprecedented targets to be achieved.”

…

“Attempting to achieve net-zero will require wrenching change. The already substantial, world-leading CO₂ emissions reductions made by the U.S. are only a fraction of what would be required. Rapid and unprecedented reordering of American energy production and use would have to happen along with huge increases in mineral production. The economy would be severely damaged. And even with all that, achieving net-zero still requires dubious assumptions and projections about future technology and behavior that likely make net-zero an impossible near-term target. Understanding these challenges and costs at the outset must inform policymakers before they pursue any version of a net-zero target.”^[45]

This developing international “energy security”^[46] reality demonstrates the political, technical and economic challenges for the Group of 7 as they endeavour to accelerate a global energy transition^[47] one that will require trillions in governmental incentives. Largely unspoken of at these meetings are the measures^[48] taken to maintain “temporary” supplies of fossil fuels in face of the EU’s electricity crisis, efforts to mitigate rising energy prices in the UK^[49] and efforts by the US to maintain low gasoline prices.

Other authors have advanced more forcible arguments about this issue:

“Even more ironic (or insane), China dominates the world’s wind, solar and battery technologies, their raw material supply chains and their manufacturing. U.S. politicians may be ramping up talk about reducing dependence on China for critical items related to American economic and national security they are demanding and pursuing policies that make the USA and West ever more dependent on so-called “clean renewable” energy from wind, solar, battery and fossil powerhouse China.

We are witnessing a geopolitical shift of historic proportions. Fossil fuel-friendly China and other autocratic producers will be the biggest winners; fossil fuel-repressing democratic America and the West the biggest losers.” ^[50]

These are a sampling of the strategic issues that could have been referenced in, or considered by, the EF2023 report. Usefully, the CER had earlier reported fact that Canada was already a world leader in electricity generation from renewable and non-emitting sources (in 2018 more than two-thirds of Canadian electricity generation was derived from renewable sources).^[51] Hence, the ongoing focus on emissions tends to diminish the fact that Canada already has one of the cleanest electricity systems in the world (led by hydropower), reportedly with over 83 per cent sourced from non-emitters^[52] even as Canadian political leaders pursue ever-more stringent policies with proposed Clean Electrical Regulations.

Significantly, there are material costs estimated for the achievement of such a clean electrical transition. The Public Policy Forum noted:

“The Conference Board of Canada has put the cost of the clean electricity transformation before us at $1.7 trillion, nearly the size of the entire Canadian economy in 2023. Université de Montreal’s Canada Energy Outlook report estimates the price tag at $1.1 trillion, although that did not include such infrastructure expenses as charging stations. Incredibly for the national Project of the Century, there is very little economic modelling publicly available.”^[53]

Canada has chosen to respond to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) with hundreds of billions of dollars of new spending and tax breaks for new energy sources. In so doing, the Federal government is wagering an enormous financial bet on alternative, non-emitting energy, one that approaches $30 billion in subsidies for battery production plants alone with another $60 billion allocated for clean energy tax credits and $20 billion in sustainable infrastructure investments. All this is in response to what some critics believe is a material U.S. legislative over-reaction with the IRA with costs now estimated at US $1.2 trillion^[54]. Some commentators, such as William McNally of Wilfred Laurier University, have brought attention to the adverse economic distortions arising from these subsidized “transitional” energy strategies:

“What’s the distortion that this causes for the rest of the economy? Taxes have to go up. There’s less money to be spent on other priorities like health care. So we’re definitely going to pay for this.”^[55]

Other commentators suggest that in order to reverse diminishing future economic prospects from these policies Canada must make “a dramatic U-turn based on common sense and real-world evidence” noting that:

“…the federal government and several provinces continue to march forward on a massive centrally-planned restructuring of the Canadian economy and our energy markets despite disastrous results in the parts of Europe and the United States that have pursued similar policies. Which raises a common sense question: if this approach didn’t work in Europe and the U.S., why implement the same policies in Canada and expect different results?”^[56]

Given these concerns,^[57] and others from the Parliamentary Budget Officer,^[58] should a national regulator be laser-focussed “on the challenge of achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050” and issues associated with “integrating Canada’s energy, economic and climate goals” and “end goals of achieving net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2050” or should it seek to provide Canadians with a clear vision of the true costs and consequences of these policies?

Similarly, is it appropriate for a national energy regulator to accept direction from government to consider an energy economy that is greatly reduced, or even perhaps devoid, of hydrocarbon production while appearing to ignore international and economic realities for energy security? This approach appears to ignore, or at least diminish, the reality that G20 countries are increasingly confronted with concerns about the basic science and feasibility of attaining net-zero. Arguably, any considerations of the Canadian national interest should embrace parallel considerations of feasible policy alternatives.^[59]

Importantly, other methodologies are being proposed.

“But while adaptation has an excellent record of success, mitigation has proven a costly failure. Despite 30 years of aggressive international mitigation effort, global carbon dioxide emissions have continued to rise whereas adaptation efforts have shown considerable success at reducing risks to health and agricultural yields from weather variability. It is, moreover, a long-established view in mainstream climate economics that the primary response to climate change will (and should be) adaptation rather than heroic but prohibitively costly attempts to prevent warming. As the costs of mitigation efforts mount it is necessary for policy-makers to confront the risk that continued attempts at aggressive mitigation policy may in fact impede adaption and increase the harm from future warming.”^[60]

The Government of Canada Adaptation Action Plan,^[61] released alongside the National Adaptation Strategy in November 2022, appears to recognise the importance of this parallel approach.

Determinations of the Canadian national interest in matters of energy will require sustained, intellectual efforts from experts freed from the constraints of policy aspirations of governments. The fundamental challenge facing not just the CER, but all Canadians, is to have access to expert, balanced and comprehensive advice about the costs and consequences of proposed net-zero policies – with parallel, balanced assessments of possible alternatives.

These questions, concerning relevance, credibility and independence, are the real challenges facing our “modernized” CER.

* Ron Wallace, Ph.D. is based in Calgary, Alberta. In addition to extensive international service he has also served on energy and environmental regulators and advisory boards for Federal, Provincial and Territorial agencies. He retired as a Permanent Member to the National Energy Board in 2016.

1. “Canada’s Energy Future 2023” (2023), online (pdf): CER <www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/canada-energy-future/2023/canada-energy-futures-2023.pdf>.
2. Ibid at 4.
3. Ibid at 1.
4. David J. Martin, “Comment: What happened to Liberal promises on NEB?” Times Colonist (12 January 2016), online: <www.timescolonist.com/opinion/comment-what-happened-to-liberal-promises-on-neb-4630840>.
5. Ibid.
6. Hon. Justin Trudeau, “Minister of Natural Resources Mandate letter” (12 November 2015), online: <www.pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/2015/11/12/archived-minister-natural-resources-mandate-letter>.
7. Hon. Jim Carr, “Statement from the Honourable Jim Car on the Suspension of the Energy East Hearings” (1 September 2016), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/natural-resources-canada/news/2016/09/statement-honourable-carr-suspension-energy-east-hearings.html>.
8. The Canadian Press, “Timeline: TransCanada’s controversial Energy East pipeline” CTV News (5 October 2017), online: <www.ctvnews.ca/business/timeline-transcanada-s-controversial-energy-east-pipeline-1.3621145>.
9. Markham Hislop, “Why did TransCanada cancel $12 billion Energy East pipeline project?” The American Energy News (6 October 2017), online: <theamericanenergynews.com/markham-on-energy/energy-east-transcanada-06oct17>.
10. “Forward, Together – Enabling Canada’s Clean, Safe and Secure Energy Future” (15 May 2017) NEB Modernization Expert Panel Report, online (pdf): NRCan <natural-resources.canada.ca/sites/nrcan/files/pdf/NEB-Modernization-Report-EN-WebReady.pdf>.
11. Nigel Bankes, “The NEB Modernization Report” (14 June 2017), online: ABlawg <ablawg.ca/2017/06/14/the-neb-modernization-report>.
12. “Environmental and Regulatory Reviews: Discussion Paper” (June 2017), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/assessments/environmental-reviews/share-your-views/proposed-approach/discussion-paper.html>.
13. “A new Canadian Energy Regulator” (28 August 2019), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/assessments/environmental-reviews/national-energy-board-modernization.html>.
14. McLennan Ross, “The Notorious Bill C-69 Becomes Law in Canada” Mondaq (12 July 2019), online: <www.mondaq.com/canada/climate-change/825356/the-notorious-bill-c-69-becomes-law-in-canada>.
15. “Senate committee recommends amendments to Bill C-69” (21 May 2019) Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, online: Senate of Canada <sencanada.ca/en/newsroom/enev-senate-committee-recommends-amendments-to-bill-c-69>.
16. The Canadian Press, “Bill C-69 gets a rough ride at Senate committee hearing in Calgary” CBC (10 April 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/calgary-senate-hearing-bill-c69-oilsands-energy-projects-pipelines-1.5091846>.
17. Bruce Cheadle, “Justin Trudeau halts Northern Gateway, approves Kinder Morgan expansion, Line 3” Global News (last updated 30 November 2016), online: <www.globalnews.ca/news/3094856/northern-gateway-pipeline-line-3-pipeline-announcement>.
18. Ron Wallace, “The Tortuous Path to NEB ‘Modernization’” (July 2018) 6:2 Energy Regulation Q, online: ERQ <energyregulationquarterly.ca/articles/the-tortuous-path-to-neb-modernization>.
19. “Vivian Kraus: New U.S. funding for the war on Canadian oil” Financial Post (29 November 2013), online: <financialpost.com/opinion/vivian-krause-new-u-s-funding-for-the-war-on-canadian-oil>.
20. “Public inquiry into anti-Alberta energy campaigns” (last updated 20 November 2020) Final report, online: Government of Alberta <www.alberta.ca/public-inquiry-into-anti-alberta-energy-campaigns.aspx>.
21. “It’s been a great run NEB: After almost 60 years, the National Energy Board to be replaced with the Canadian Energy Regulator” (9 February 2018), online: McCarthy Tétrault LLP <www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/canadian-energy-perspectives/its-been-great-run-neb-after-almost-60-years-national-energy-board-be-replaced-canadian-energy-regulator>.
22. Rowland Harrison, Neil McCrank, and Ron Wallace, “ The Structure of the Canadian Energy Regulator: A Questionable New Model for Governance of Energy Regulation Tribunals?” (April 2020) 8:1 Energy Regulation Q, online: ERQ <energyregulationquarterly.ca/articles/the-structure-of-the-canadian-energy-regulator-a-questionable-new-model-for-governance-of-energy-regulation-tribunals>
23. Supra note 1 at 4.
24. Will Kenton, “Regulatory Capture Definition With Examples” Investopedia (last updated 1 March 2021), online: <www.investopedia.com/terms/r/regulatory-capture.asp>.
25. “Energy and Natural Resources organizational structure” (last updated 10 August 2023), online: NRCan <natural-resources.canada.ca/home/about-us/natural-resources-canada-organizational-structure/23054>.
26. “The Paris Agreement” (12 December 2015), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/paris-agreement.html>.
27. Sudarshan Varadhan and Nidhi Verma, “G20 bloc fails to reach agreement on cutting fossil fuels” Reuters (23 July 2023), online: <www.reuters.com/business/energy/g20-draft-tweaked-reflect-dissent-cutting-unabated-fossil-fuels-2023-07-22>.
28. “Iraq, TotalEnergies sign massive oil, gas, renewables deal” Reuters (10 July 2023), online: <www.reuters.com/business/energy/iraq-totalenergies-sign-27-bln-deal-energy-projects-2023-07-10>.
29. AFP, “Global coal demand to stay near record in 2023: IEA” Insider Paper (27 July 2023), online: <insiderpaper.com/global-coal-demand-to-stay-near-record-in-2023-iea>.
30. Supra note 1 at 4
31. “Market Snapshot: New projects in Alberta could add significant carbon storage capacity by 2030” (21 December 2022) Upcoming CCS projects in Alberta, online: CER <www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/market-snapshots/2022/market-snapshot-new-projects-alberta-could-add-significant-carbon-storage-capacity-2030.html>.
32. Layla Nelson, “In a net-zero future, Canadian oil production could peak as early as 2026, according to the Energy Regulator” Canada Today (20 June 2023), online: <canadatoday.news/ca/in-a-net-zero-future-canadian-oil-production-could-peak-as-early-as-2026-according-to-the-energy-regulator-382373>.
33. Inayat Singh, “Canada energy regulator criticized for not modelling net-zero future” CBC (14 December 2021), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/science/cer-report-missing-net-zero-1.6285394>.
34. “Canada’s Energy Future 2021” (2021), online (pdf): CER <www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/canada-energy-future/2021/canada-energy-futures-2021.pdf>.
35. Julia Levin, supra note 33.
36. Natural Resources Canada, “Minister Wilkinson’s Statement Regarding the Canada Energy Regulator’s First Long-Term Outlook Modelling Net-Zero by 2050 in Canada” (20 June 2023), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/natural-resources-canada/news/2023/06/minister-wilkinsons-statement-regarding-the-canada-energy-regulators-first-long-term-outlook-modelling-net-zero-by-2050-in-canada.html>.
37. Letter from the Honourable Jonathan Wilkinson to Cassie Doyle (16 December 2021), online (pdf): <www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/about/news-room/whats-new/2021/canadas-energy-future-report-minister-letter-to-cer-16-december-2021.pdf>.
38. Letter from Cassie Doyle to the Honourable Jonathan (20 December 2021), online: CER <www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/about/news-room/whats-new/2022/letter-from-the-chairperson-canadas-energy-future-report-letter-to-minister-20-december-2021.html>.
39. Stewart Muir, “Energy regulator should deal in reality” Financial Post (28 June 2023), online: <epaper.calgaryherald.com/article/281831468170899>.
40. Ibid.
41. Supra note 27.
42. “Powering Canada Forward: Building a Clean, Affordable ,and Reliable Electricity System for Every Region of Canada” (last updated 31 August 2023), online: NRCan <natural-resources.canada.ca/our-natural-resources/energy-sources-distribution/electricity-infrastructure/powering-canada-forward-building-clean-affordable-and-reliable-electricity-system-for/25259>.
43. “G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué” (20 May 2023), online: The White House <www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/g7-hiroshima-leaders-communique>.
44. Motoko Rich, Lisa Friedman and Jim Tankersley, “Behind the Scenes, G7 Nations Wrangle Over Ambitious Climate Commitments” The New York Times (20 May 2023), online: <www.nytimes.com/2023/05/20/world/asia/climate-fossil-fuels-g7.html>.
45. IER, “The Challenges and Costs of Net-Zero and the Future of Energy” (9 August 2023), online: IER <www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/the-grid/the-challenges-and-costs-of-net-zero-and-the-future-of-energy>.
46. Jack Mintz and Ron Wallace, “The global energy transition confronts East vs West realpolitik” (April 2022), online (pdf): Macdonald Laurier Institute <macdonaldlaurier.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Apr2022_The_global_energy_transition_confronts_EastvsWest_realpolitik_Mintz_Wallace_PAPER_FWeb.pdf>.
47. Paul Krugman, “Biden and America’s Big Green Push” The New York Times (17 August 2023), online: <www.nytimes.com/2023/08/17/opinion/biden-green-ira-industrial-trade.html>.
48. Tsvetana Paraskova, “Germany Signs Long-Term U.S. LNG Deal To Replace Russian Gas” (23 June 2023), online: OilPrice.com <oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Germany-Signs-Long-Term-US-LNG-Deal-To-Replace-Russian-Gas.html>.
49. Sachin Ravikumar and Susanna Twidale, “Britain commits to hundreds of North Sea oil and gas licenses” Reuters (31 July 2023), online: <www.reuters.com/business/energy/uk-grant-hundreds-new-north-sea-oil-gas-licences-2023-07-31>./
50. Don Ritter, “Abandon Fossil Fuels, Empower China” Townhall (30 July 2023), online: <townhall.com/columnists/don-ritter/2023/07/30/abandon-fossil-fuels-empower-china-n2626379>.
51. “Canada’s Renewable Power – Canada” (last updated 30 June 2022), online: CER <www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-commodities/electricity/report/canadas-renewable-power/provinces/renewable-power-canada-canada.html>.
52. “Canada 2022 Energy Policy Review” (January 2022) Executive Summary, online: IEA <www.iea.org/reports/canada-2022/executive-summary>.
53. Janet Annesley, David Campbell, Arash Golshan and Edward Greenspon, “Project of the Century: A Blueprint for Growing Canada’s Clean Electricity Supply – and Fast” (19 July 2023) Energy Future Forum, online: Public Policy Forum <ppforum.ca/publications/net-zero-electricity-canada-capacity>.
54. The Editorial Board, “The Real Cost of the Inflation Reduction Act Subsidies: $1.2 Trillion” The Wall Street Journal (24 March 2023), online: <www.wsj.com/articles/inflation-reduction-act-subsidies-cost-goldman-sachs-report-5623cd29>.
55. Rahul Vaidyanath, “Ottawa’s Competition With the US Inflation Reduction Act, ESG Investing Distort the Economy: Analysts” The Epoch Times (27 July 2023), online: <www.theepochtimes.com/article/ottawas-competition-with-us-inflation-reduction-act-esg-investing-distort-the-economy-analysts-5427108>.
56. Jason Clemens and Niels Veldhuis, “Wanted: Common sense in Ottawa” Financial Post (8 August 2023), online: <epaper.calgaryherald.com/article/281827173286581>.
57. Terence Corcoran, “Net zero plans, slower growth and trade wars coming soon to an economy near you” Financial Post (21 June 2023), online: <financialpost.com/opinion/net-zero-plans-slower-growth-trade-wars-economy>.
58. Nasreddine Ammar, Marianne Laurin and Diarra Sourang, “A Distributional Analysis of the Federal Fuel Charge under the 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan” (30 March 2023), online: Parliamentary Budget Officer <www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2223-028-S–distributional-analysis-federal-fuel-charge-under-2030-emissions-reduction-plan–analyse-distributive-redevance-federale-combustibles-dans-cadre-plan-reduction-emissions-2030>.
59. Kevin Stocklin, “Princeton, MIT Scientists Say EPA Climate Regulations Based on a ‘Hoax’” The Epoch Times (12 August 2023), online: <www.theepochtimes.com/mkt_app/article/two-princeton-mit-scientists-say-epa-climate-regulations-based-on-a-hoax-5460699>.
60. Ross McKitrick, “Adaptation needs greater focus in climate policy” (June 2023), online (pdf): Macdonald Laurier Institute <macdonaldlaurier.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/20230614_Adaptation-needs-greater-focus-McKitrick_PAPER-v2.pdf>.
61. Environment and Climate Change Canada, News Release, Plan, prepare, act: Government of Canada launches first National Adaptation Strategy” (27 June 2023), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2023/06/plan-prepare-act-government-of-canada-launches-first-national-adaptation-strategy.html>.